Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Vol. 23: No. 1 (Winter 2018)

Article 3

Winter 2018

Crossing Troubled Waters: Joining NonSignatories in Maritime Arbitration - The CoOptation and Containment of Consent in United
States and British Law
Glenys P. Spence
Arizona Summit Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Admiralty Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons,
Contracts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Spence, Glenys P. (2018) "Crossing Troubled Waters: Joining Non-Signatories in Maritime Arbitration - The Co-Optation and
Containment of Consent in United States and British Law," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol23/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Crossing Troubled Waters: Joining
Non-Signatories In Maritime
Arbitration—The Co-Optation and
Containment of Consent in United
States and British Law
Glenys P. Spence*
INTRODUCTION

Arbitration is an ancient method of resolving disputes
privately between parties who agree to the jurisdiction of an
impartial tribunal.1 In medieval times, the ancient Greeks
submitted their disputes to the Oracle at Delphi. Even after the
Roman Conquest, arbitration continued to be the favored method
of dispute resolution among the Greeks.2 At the bedrock of
arbitration is the single pillar of consent.3 Coercion, then, is
antithetical to the fundamental tenets of arbitration because the
common understanding is that there must be an agreement to

* J.D. LL.M., Admiralty and Maritime Law, Assistant Professor of
Law, Arizona Summit Law School.
1. JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, International Sales Law
and Arbitration: Problems, Cases, and Commentary 31 (Wolters Kluwer
2010).
2. W. L. Westermann, Interstate Arbitration in Antiquity, 2 CLASSICAL
J., no. 5, Mar. 1907, at 198 (“The honor therefore of first formulating the
principle of interstate arbitration and of first putting it into practice lies with
the Greeks.”).
3. See William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts:
An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CONSENT, PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Oxford 2009) (“Like
consummated romance, arbitration rests on consent.”).
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arbitrate.4 This agreement is generally contained in the parties’
contract after all parties have negotiated the essential terms, such
as choice of law and choice of forum. Therefore, a party should not
be compelled to arbitrate a claim absent that party’s informed
consent. The contractual provision to arbitrate
confers
jurisdiction on an arbitral tribunal or a panel of arbitrators and
serves as the sole source of that authority.5
Compared to litigation, arbitration is generally understood as
a “friendly” forum where all parties have the power to choose the
arbitrators. However, in recent times, this age-old dispute
resolution mechanism has come under fire because arbitration is
now viewed by many policymakers, lawyers, and a large segment
of the population as a sword and not a shield.6 In the United
States, there is a concerted effort among policy makers to create
legislation that would eliminate forced arbitration as it relates to
consumer, employment, and civil rights issues.7 These efforts
resulted in the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act.8 The proposed
legislation
gained
some
support
during
the
Obama
administration, but appears to be still-born upon the ushering in
of a new Republican administration.9
The issue of forced arbitration cuts across the spectrum of
society. In the area of commercial law, arbitration has always
4. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 1, at 32 (“[T]hird parties
cannot be required to participate in arbitration without express consent.”).
5. See Park, supra note 3, at 3 (“For arbitrators, motions to join nonsignatories create a tension between two principles: maintaining arbitration’s
consensual nature, and maximizing an award’s practical effectiveness by
binding related persons.”).
6. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams with Sen. Al Franken and Rep.
Henry Johnson, in Gaining Ground, TRIAL: FORCED ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017,
at 31, 31 (stating that replacing the judicial process with forced arbitration
discards “the body of law and jurisprudence under which a decision can be
made” and replaces this system with “a private, for profit, anything-goes type
of system.”).
7. See Jessica Guynn, “Enough is enough”: Gretchen Carlson says bill
ending arbitration would break silence in sexual harassment cases, USA
TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2017/12/06/bipartisan-bill-would-eliminate-forced-arbitration-break-silencesexual-harassment-cases/925226001/.
8. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017).
9. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams, supra note 6, at 33 (recounting
Rep. Johnson’s statement: “I believe that as long as Republicans control the
House of Representatives, I see no prospects for the Arbitration Fairness Act
to see the light of day.”).
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been the preferred method of settling commercial disputes.
However, in recent times, the decision to arbitrate has become a
one-sided affair. In the maritime context, arbitration is frequently
the preferred method of dispute resolution, and the arbitral
process threatens to destabilize litigation in the world of shipping.
Long respected as a unique and special “club,” maritime lawyers
now find the doors of the courtroom closed.10 The fields of
maritime law and arbitration are as old as the sea.11 However,
maritime disputes, because of their complexity, have always been
guided by a unique system of laws.12
In modern maritime practice, the omnipresence of arbitration
clauses that lie cloistered in the fine print of contracts across the
commercial spectrum is giving rise to issues of fraud and
unconscionability in maritime contracts. At bottom, the resistance
is not about the arbitration itself, but the absence of consent
among parties who were unaware that the doors of the courthouse
would be closed in the event of a dispute. Arbitration, then, is
now viewed as a nemesis to litigation.13 This negative view of
arbitration is amplified because the process is mired in secrecy.
Compared to our system of litigation and our legal culture of
transparency, a system that is characteristically non-transparent
is vulnerable to attack particularly when the rights of weaker
parties are juxtaposed against the might of a large corporation or

10. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams, supra note 6, at 32 (positing
that arbitration is a good thing in principle and it pervades the shipping
community; going into an arbitration or being drawn into one, is to enter a
world of practice that is different from litigation, and some knowledge of
arbitration is indispensable to the maritime lawyer).
11. James Allsop, Chief Justice, Address to the 16th Conference of Chief
Justices of Asia and the Pacific: Comity and Commerce (Nov. 8, 2015)
(describing the development of commercial practices with regards to
maritime trade, including the Laws of Manu circa 1500 BCE and the various
customary codes of Greece and Egypt and the maritime law of the Rhodians
within Justinian’s Digest).
12. See NICHOLAS J. HEALY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 1
(West 5th ed. 2012) (“In writings from Babylonian times until the collapse of
the Roman empire, traces remain of a cluster of doctrines of maritime law
that persist to this day.”).
13. See Deepak Gupta, Fighting the Fine Print, TRIAL: FORCED
ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017, at 24, 25 (“Over the last decade, corporations have
used the fine print to block the courthouse doors by forcing consumers and
employees into arbitration.”).
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other powerful entities.14
What’s even more troubling is the fact that over the last
decade, the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
moved closer to favoring arbitration even where non-signatories to
a contract have argued on the basis of consent. In its earlier
jurisprudence, the Court has long recognized and reiterated that
arbitration must be consensual under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and federal maritime law.15
But, in maritime transactions, it is often difficult to identify
all of the parties to a contract. Because maritime law is sui
generis international, the very nature of maritime transactions is
based on a chain of transactions, which includes
multiple
contracts with multiple parties across several countries. When a
dispute arises from these contracts, the challenge of identifying
the proper parties to the contract is more pronounced in
international commercial arbitration.16
Historically, the doctrine of privity of contract controls the
obligations and rights of the parties to sue on a given contract.17
Thus, the issue of jurisdiction over the parties is often a bone of
contention for arbitral bodies. In international commercial
arbitration, it is more likely than not that one of the parties will
14. See Paul Bland & Dani Zylberberg, In the Dark: A System of Secrecy,
TRIAL: FORCED ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017, at 40, 41 (“An open and transparent
court system has long been a pillar of our democracy, guaranteeing fair
proceedings . . . and ensuring public support and acceptance of the ‘means
used to achieve justice.’”).
15. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684
(2010) (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party
agreed to do so.”); id. at 683 (“We think it is also clear from our precedents
and the contractual nature of arbitration that parties may specify with whom
they choose to arbitrate their disputes.”); see also EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
16. See CLARE AMBROSE, KAREN MAXWELL & ANGHARAD PARRY, LONDON
MARITIME ARBITRATION 229 (Bruce Harris ed., 3d ed. 2009) (“In charter party
or bill of lading contracts it is extremely common for the contract to be signed
or concluded by an agent. . . . [I]t is important to take every precaution to
ensure that any claim is asserted against the proper party. Any dispute as to
the identity of the proper party to sue (or be sued) can normally be
categorised as a jurisdictional issue . . . .”).
17. See BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT 11
(2012).
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challenge the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the dispute based on
the choice of forum or choice of law clauses. Often, this challenge
to jurisdiction is raised on the basis that either one of the parties
did not consent to arbitration or is not a signatory on the
underlying contract.18
This Article seeks to analyze the joinder of parties who are
non-signatories in certain maritime contracts where these parties
are seeking to avoid arbitration. This Article will grapple with the
question of whether consent in international arbitration has been
rendered irrelevant through the practice of joinder. At issue is
whether the current practice of joining these non-signatories to
arbitration disregards the fundamental principle of consent that is
central to arbitration, and thus offends public policy both in the
United States and internationally.
Unlike litigation, there are no per se rules of joinder in the
realm of arbitration, and non-signatories to an
underlying
contract containing an arbitration clause, will resist the insistence
by the opposing side to arbitrate. In recent times, however,
arbitral tribunals have employed “joinder-like” instruments to join
non-signatories to arbitration under the rubric of “deemed
consent.”19
Invoking language such as “commercial reality,” “economic
reality,” corporate veil-piercing, alter-ego, and equitable principles
of “estoppel” in myriad forms, courts and arbitral tribunals have
legitimized the practice of joining non-signatories to arbitration.20
While in practice, the borrowing of joinder rules serve the needs of
uniformity in international commercial transactions, and
international trade, the practice of joining non-signatories to
arbitration has met with some hostility both in the United States,
Britain, and other European countries.21 In fact, this practice
may offend the public policy of some countries, creating conflict of
laws issues in the fractious space of international trade.
18. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 75.
19. See Park, supra note 3, at 8–9 (explaining the analysis arbitrators
undertake to join non-signatories).
20. See id. at 12 (“References to ‘surrogates’ or ‘substitutes’ for consent
sometimes serve as catchphrases to explain joinder situations in which
arbitrators or courts deem an arbitration agreement to exist. However,
sound doctrine should never countenance a suggestion that consent has
somehow become irrelevant.”).
21. Id. at 14.
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This Article will analyze the issue of joinder under the
principles of estoppel under United States law, the Group of
Companies Doctrine adopted by some Continental legal systems,22
and the English Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.23
At the crux of this analysis is to what extent this practice disturbs
the fundamental principles that form the basis of international
public policy such as those rights enshrined in Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), The Right to a
Fair Trial,24 the British Human Rights Act 1998,25 and American
public policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).26
The issue of joinder where a party is seeking to avoid
arbitration will be explored through the lens of shipbroker
contracts.27 Recently, in International Chartering, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals revisited the issue of joining nonsignatories to arbitration.28 In predecessor cases to International
Chartering, the court held that the joinder of a non-signatory to an
arbitration proceeding without the party’s consent was in violation
of American public policy.29 In Republic of Ecuador, the court
explained that “a choice-of-law clause will govern where a
nonsignatory to a particular arbitration agreement seeks to
22. See Dow Chemicals v. Isover Saint-Gobain, 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 131,
136 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1984) (a claim was brought not only by the companies
who signed the arbitration agreement but also by their parent company and a
French subsidiary in the same group).
23. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, ch. 31 (Eng.), available
at
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/31/pdfs/ukpga_19990031_en.pdf.
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No.
5 (Eur.).
25. Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/pdfs/ukpga_19980042_en.pdf.
26. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1925).
27. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, Shipbrokers’ Commissions: Entitlement,
Standing, and Jurisdiction, 24 TUL. MAR. L. J. 55, 55 (1999) (“Shipbrokers act
as intermediaries and agents between owners and charterers of a vessel.”).
28. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), remanded by 557 Fed. Appx. 81 (2d Cir.
2014).
29. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that “[a]n American nonsignatory cannot be bound to arbitrate in the
absence of a full showing of facts supporting an articulable theory based on
American contract law or American agency law”); see also Republic of Ecuador
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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enforce the agreement against a signatory, but not where a
signatory seeks to enforce the agreement against a nonsignatory.”30
International Chartering rests on the same footing.31 As in
Republic of Ecuador, a signatory is asking the court to compel the
non-signatory to arbitration. However, the court announced that
it was in fact, overruling itself in Republic of Ecuador based on the
doctrine of direct benefit estoppel.32
Given this posture,
shipbrokers must be diligent to ensure that they understand the
standard language in the charter party form.33 According to
International Chartering, the incorporation of commission terms34
will bind brokers to the charter party, even where there is a
change in ownership of the vessel, or where there is a separate
agreement between the original owners and the brokers.35
In addition to the issue of joinder of non-signatories,
International Chartering raises choice of law issues.36
The
30. 376 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (emphasis added).
31. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 635.
32. See id. at 635–36 (reasoning that Republic of Ecuador was incorrect).
33. See STEWART C. BOYD ET AL., SCRUTTON ON CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLS
OF LADING 3 n.19 (21st ed. 2008) (“Charterparty: in medieval Latin, carta
partita, an instrument written in duplicate on a single sheet and then divided
by indented edges so that each part fitted the other.”). The legal relations
between the owner of the vessel and the charterer are controlled by the
charter party. Id. at 3, art. 3–4. In legal disputes, the terms of the charter
party itself are controlling. See E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford v. M/V Alaia, 673
F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. La. 1987) (“A charter party, such as the New York
Produce Exchange time charter . . . is merely a form of contract and is
generally subject to the rules and principles of construction for ordinary
commercial contracts.”); see also Marine Overseas Servs., Inc. v. Crossocean
Shipping Co., 791 F.2d 1227, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that a charter
comes into existence when “the traditional elements of a contract are present”
(citation omitted)).
34. See Brokerage Commission: An Overview, FISHERS SOLICITORS (July
22, 2011), http://www.fisherslondon.com/pages/news/index.asp?NewsID=50
(“Brokerage commission is payable under a time charter on hire. Standard
form charters will ordinarily stipulate that commission is only payable on
hire that is both earned and paid (see for example the NYPE form). Subject
to the precise wording of the charter, the broker’s entitlement to commission
will therefore only arise when the charterers remit hire or it is recovered by
some other means.”).
35. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 642. According to
Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., if the benefit sued upon (i.e., broker’s
commission) depends on the charter party for its existence, then under the
doctrine of direct benefit estoppel, the brokers will be deemed to consent to
arbitration. Id. at 636.
36. See id. at 635.

2018]

MARITIME ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

61

question for the court was whether federal maritime law or
English law applied to the charter parties at issue.37 Both the
District Court and the Second Circuit held that English law
applied to the charter parties because if federal maritime law
applied, the charter parties’ reference to “Owners and the
Charterers” would not apply to the shipbrokers.38
In arriving at this conclusion, the court’s decision revived the
age old question of whether shipbroker contracts are “firmly
entrenched” within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States.39 The court held that under English law, the phrase
“Owners and the Charterers” in the charter party includes
shipbrokers, while in the United States, brokers are not
characterized as such.40 Therefore, federal maritime law and
English law will produce different outcomes, which compel a
choice of law analysis.41
The choice of law issues will be analyzed alongside the
preliminary contracts doctrine under United States maritime law.
This Article hopes to convey that the time has come for United
States courts to decide whether federal maritime law applies ex
propio vigore to shipbroker commissions. These contracts should
be squarely within the ambit of admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of
their symbiotic nature with the charter party. In addition to the
admiralty jurisdiction question, International Chartering revives
the thorny question as to the fairness of binding a non-signatory
to a charter party which includes an arbitration choice of law
clause. Acknowledging that the issue is fraught with uncertainty,
the court concluded that English law governed the claims under
the charter parties and ruled that the parties must bring their

37. See id. at 634.
38. See id. at 634, 642; id. at 634 (“This Court previously determined
that under federal law, the charter parties’ arbitration clauses—which by
their terms apply only to ‘Owners and the Charterers’—did not apply to
Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit did not reverse that conclusion. ‘Were
substantive federal maritime law to apply, [the District Court’s holding]
might be correct.’” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
39. Id. at 634.
40. Id.
41. Id. (“Thus, as the Second Circuit held, ‘[s]ince English law and
federal law produce different results, the choice of law analysis is
essential.’”).
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claims to arbitration in London.42
The Second Circuit foreclosed a prime opportunity to clarify
this area of law to the detriment of international maritime
arbitration.43 International Chartering, with its implication of
English law in the area of maritime jurisdiction as it relates to
broker contracts, provided fertile ground for the court to offer a
definitive response to the question of maritime jurisdiction over
the so-called preliminary contracts doctrine.44
The presence of a choice of law clause in International
Chartering allowed the court to sidestep the issue of whether
brokerage contracts are creatures of maritime law.45 The oftenused alibi of international uniformity gave the court an “out” in
this choppy area of admiralty jurisdiction, and the parties were
sent out into the channels of English law.46 Where a dispute is
international, courts favor arbitration, and even in situations
where a party’s substantive rights are implicated, courts will
subjugate the important issue of United States admiralty
jurisprudence for the international principles of comity and
uniformity.47
Indeed, the court’s acknowledgment that English law will
provide a remedy for the brokers in International Chartering,
because they will be deemed as “owners” and “charterers” in
England, begs the question of whether they should receive the
same treatment under United States law.48 The court stated that
International Chartering will not sound in admiralty because,
under federal law, brokers and charterers are not included in the
phrase “Owners and the Charterers,” but it stopped short of
42. Id. at 642–43.
43. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F.
App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2014).
44. See id.
45. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
46. See id. at 642.
47. See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S.
526, 537 (1995) (“Petitioner’s skepticism . . . must give way to contemporary
principles of international comity and commercial practice.”); id. at 537–38
(“[T]he historical judicial resistance to foreign forum selection clauses ‘has
little place in an era when . . . businesses once essentially local now operate
in world markets.’” (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
12 (1972))).
48. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 634.
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revisiting the preliminary contracts doctrine.49
The questions on remand seem to suggest a nod towards the
application of federal law if the brokers’ claims were found
independent of the charter parties.50 The court ordered the
parties to provide further briefing on the choice of law issues for
claims independent of the charter parties.51 Notably, the court
requested further briefing on whether certain claims were
independent of the charter party, and if so, whether those claims
should be subject to arbitration in London as a matter of contract
law.52 If not, the court asked the parties to explain how the
question should be resolved under federal law.53
Part I of this Article will provide a background of the
International Chartering Services (ICS) case which provides
context for some of the issues raised in this Article. Part II
discusses the practice of shipbrokering within the principles of
agency law; Part III discusses the preliminary contracts doctrine
under the law of admiralty to demonstrate that primary
jurisdiction over maritime contracts lies with the admiralty
jurisdiction of courts. Part IV introduces comparative principles
of arbitration through an explanation of British maritime law and
the English Rights of Third Party’s Act, and the Group of
Companies Doctrine to demonstrate the human rights principles
that lie at the heart of consent. Part V discusses choice of law
rules in United States jurisprudence as it relates to international
49. Id.
50. See id. at 634, 643.
51. Id. at 643.
52. Id. (holding that “[a]dditional [b]riefing is [n]ecessary to [d]etermine
[w]hether [p]laintiffs [h]ave [c]laims [i]ndependent of the [c]harter [p]arties”).
53. Id. The Court requested briefing on the following issues: (1) “Should
the question of whether Plaintiffs have claims independent of the
charterparties [sic]—claims that cannot be arbitrated—be determined by this
Court, or by the arbitrators in England?”; (2) “If the Court should make the
determination, then as a matter of contract law, do Plaintiffs have claims
against Defendants independent of the charter parties?”; (3) “If Plaintiffs’
claims are independent as a matter of contract law, is there any reason why
they must still arbitrate such claims under the charter parties? For each of
these questions, the parties should (a) address whether English or federal
law applies, (b) explain how the question should be resolved under English
law . . . .”; (4) “Finally, the parties should address what would happen if the
Court, applying federal law, determines that Plaintiffs must arbitrate all of
their claims in London—yet under English law, the arbitrators would refuse
to hear some or all of those claims.” Id.
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arbitration issues. Part VI provides a discussion of the modern
trend in the courts for joining non-signatories to arbitration
through the surrogate principles of direct benefit estoppel and the
Group of Companies Doctrine. Part VII signals the dangers for
the forced nature of arbitration that lies hidden in standard form
contracts used in the maritime industry, and Part VIII cautions
against the potential threat of forced arbitration to the need for
arbitration in the international legal system. Finally, the Article
concludes with the importance of consent as the bedrock of
arbitration, and the pivotal role that consent plays in the ongoing
quest for uniformity and certainty in the international legal
system of commercial law and arbitration.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Charter Parties

Plaintiffs, shipbrokers International Chartering Services
(ICS) and Peraco Chartering (USA) LLC (Peraco), filed a
declaratory judgment in state court for breach of contract and
breach of maritime contract on the basis that defendants, thirteen
vessel owners (ship-owning defendants) that were wholly owned
subsidiaries of Defendant Anemi Maritime Services S.A. (Anemi),
were liable for commissions payable under brokerage
agreements.54 At the time the charter parties were signed, Anemi
was a wholly owned subsidiary of non-party Kyrini Shipping Inc.55
After the contracts were finalized, Anemi and its subsidiaries
were purchased by Eagle Bulk Shipping, Inc. (Eagle), making
Eagle and its wholly owned subsidiaries the defendants in this
case.56
In 2006, ICS arranged meetings between Anemi and Korea
Line so that the two entities could discuss the chartering of
Anemi’s vessels (the thirteen vessels at issue in this case).57 In
2007, Korea Line and Anemi signed four master charter parties
with each chartering multiple ships.58 The charter parties were
between Korea Lines and Anemi. Anemi designated the thirteen
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 632–33.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
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ships at issue in the case. The charter parties provided that:
“[S]hould any dispute arise between Owners and the Charterers,
the matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons at
London.”59 Each of the four charter parties also contained a
choice of law provision, which stated: “This Charter Party shall be
governed by the English Law.”60
Shortly after the charter parties were signed, Eagle
purchased Anemi and its subsidiaries. ICS, Plaintiffs, were not
signatories to the charter parties.61 However, they served as the
deal breakers in that they participated in the negotiations
between Anemi and Korea Line.62 The resulting charter parties
provided commission rates payable to ICS.63 ICS argues that
these commission rates with Anemi were negotiated separately
from the charter parties.64 They contend that the commission
rates were memorialized in an email dated May 4, 2007.65
B. Modifications of Agreements
During the market downturn starting in 2007–2008, Korea
Line became insolvent, and entered into rehabilitation
proceedings in the Seoul Central District Court in Korea.66 As
part of the rehabilitation process, Korea Line, Anemi and the shipowning
defendants
negotiated
modifications
to
their
agreements.67 Notably, Eagle was not a party to these
modifications. The modifications created a “suspension period” of
one year and provided that the owners “would seek other
employment for their vessels, with Korea Line guaranteeing a
minimum income of $17,000 per vessel per day.”68 After the oneyear suspension period, the ship-owners would resume working
for Korea Line “at a reduced rate of hire, but subject to a profitsharing agreement.”69
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Eagle informed ICS (Plaintiffs) in December of 2011 that “it
would not pay their commissions during the suspension period.”70
Plaintiffs then sued Eagle in the Supreme Court of New York for
New York County, bringing various claims including: breach of
contract, breach of maritime contract, willful frustration of
contract, unjust enrichment, and accounting.71 Defendants filed a
motion to have the case removed to the District Court.72 In
response, Plaintiffs contended that “their claims did not arise
under the charter parties at all, but rather stemmed from a
separate contract memorialized in the May 4, 2007, emails.”73
In addition, Plaintiffs argued that “even if their claims did
arise under the charter parties, they were not bound by the
arbitration clauses” in the charter parties executed between
Anemi and Korea Line.74 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the owners’ motion to compel
arbitration under the charter parties.75 The Defendant ship
owners appealed the decision.76
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court’s denial on interlocutory appeal and remanded with
instructions to perform a choice of law analysis.77 The Second
Circuit held that “under English Law, Plaintiffs would be included
in the phrase ‘Owners and the Charterers’” and would be
interpreted as “assignees from the original parties.”78
The
District Court did not address the question of whether the
commission agreements were independent of the charter parties.79
On remand, the questions for the District Court to tackle were:
“(1) whether federal or English maritime law should apply under
federal maritime choice-of-law rules to the question of whether
Plaintiffs’ claims under the charter parties must be
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 633–34.
74. Id. at 634.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc.,
557 F. App’x 81, 83, n.3 (2d Cir. 2014)).
78. Id. (citing Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 557 F. App’x at 83).
79. Id.
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arbitrated, and if so, (2) whether Plaintiffs have claims that are
independent of the charter parties and need not be arbitrated.”80
The Court of Appeals concluded that the choice of law
analysis would be outcome determinative, thus deeming it
essential to the case.81 Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals determined that, under federal maritime law, Plaintiffs
were neither “owners” nor “charterers” and, if federal maritime
law were to apply, the arbitration clause in the charter parties
would not apply.82
This gap between United States law and English law as it
relates to shipbrokers signals that the time is ripe for United
States law to carve out a bright line rule as to the jurisdictional
“saltiness” of brokerage contracts. From the English line of cases,
it is clear that shipbrokers contracts are considered maritime in
nature because of their interdependence with the charter party.
In the United States, however, there is a judicial reluctance to
bring these contracts into the charter party, and hence into
maritime jurisdiction. This jurisdictional ambivalence creates
uncertainty in maritime law and has the potential to promote
uncertainty in international trade. To understand the nexus of
ship brokering contracts to maritime law, a brief description of the
business of ship brokering is necessary.
II. THE PRACTICE OF SHIPBROKERING83

A.

Agency Relationship

It is axiomatic that all parts of the shipping industry cross
international boundaries, and as such, the business of shipbrokers
is an internationalized commercial activity. Shipbrokers are
subject to the vagaries of the international freight market and
must adapt to the conditions prevailing in the international
market.84 The freight market runs on the exchange of
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. “A shipbroker is someone who arranges the ocean transport of goods
and commodities by sea, the employment of a vessel or buys and sells ships
on behalf of his clients.” A Career in Shipbroking?, BALTIC EXCH. (Aug. 2,
2006),
http://www.balticexchange.com/other-services/employment/careersadvice/index.shtml.
84. See LARS GORTON ET. AL., SHIPBROKING AND CHARTERING PRACTICE 33
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information. These information channels are facilitated through a
network consisting of various parties: owners, time charterers or
despondent owners, cargo owners, and charterers.85 These parties
negotiate their transactions through intermediaries known as
“shipbrokers” or “booking agents.”86 After negotiations are
completed, a document, the charter party, memorializes the
agreements between the owners and charterers of the vessel.87
Generally, the function of a shipbroker is to act as a
representative of his or her principal in charter negotiations.88
The broker undertakes the obligation to work to the benefit of the
principal and to protect the principal’s interests in the following
ways:
(1) The broker should keep both the owner and the
charterer continuously informed about the market
situation, the market development, available cargo
proposals and shipment possibilities, and he should, in
the best possible way, cover the market for the given
positions and orders respectively.
(2) The broker should act strictly within given authorities
in connection with the negotiations. Sometimes the
broker will have a fairly wide framework—a wide
discretion—within which to work when carrying out the
negotiations, with an absolute limit which must not be
exceeded.
(3) The broker should in all respects work loyally for his
principal and should carry out scrupulously and skillfully
the negotiations and other work connected with the
charter.
(4) The broker may not withhold any information from his
principal nor give him wrong information. Nor may he
reveal his principal’s business “secrets” and may not act
to the advantage of the counter party in the negotiations
in order to reach an agreement.89
(6th ed. 2004).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 39.
87. See id. at 107.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id.
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B. Shipbroker Commissions: Agreements Outside of the Charter
Party
A broker is entitled to a commission when the broker brings
together the principal and a third party, facilitating a meeting of
the minds on the essential terms of the agreement.90 However,
“[w]here a special contract exists, the broker’s entitlement to
commissions is entirely dependent upon the language of the
contract authorizing those commissions.”91 Where commissions
are due on the negotiation of a charter party, the payment of
commissions will depend on the language in the charter party.
Thus, if a charter party states that commissions are “due ‘on all
hire as paid under th[e] charter[s],’” then the right to commission
will accrue only to the extent that hire was actually paid.92 In
some cases, brokers will execute separate agreements outside of
the charter party form to protect themselves in the event of
cancellation of the charter party.93
A factual question that arises in brokerage disputes is
whether an obligation to pay commissions survives default or
cancellation under the charter party.94 In other words, courts
must determine whether the right to commission attaches to any
subsequent transactions between owners and charterers.
Generally, courts will find that a right to payment attaches where
the ship owner has not sustained any implied or constructive
losses or where there is no failure of performance, as in cases
where there is either an assignment or a modification of the
original charter.95 According to this view, brokers should lose the
90. Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp. v. Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp.,
499 N.Y.S. 2d 697, 1987 A.M.C. 478, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id.
93. See id. (holding that Broker not entitled to payment from settlement
funds after cancellation of charter) (citing Lougheed & Co., Ltd. v. Suzuki,
1926 A.M.C. 790, 796 (N.Y.A.D. 1926) (holding that, short of vessel owner’s
willful default, all risks, which might interfere with the earning of hire
should be shared by broker, and that all causes that where no hire earned,
the broker was not entitled to commission)).
94. Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp., 1987 A.M.C. at 483.
95. Id. at 485 (citing Kane v. Neptune Shipping, Ltd., 1948 A.M.C. 1407
(1948)). The Kane court held that “the broker was entitled to a recovery . . .
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right to commissions only where there is no substitute
performance.
However, the issue of substitute performance becomes a bone
of contention where there is a cancellation of the original charter
party or a “fix-around” of the brokers to the original charter party.
In this situation, some courts have held that, where there is a new
charter party, which amounts to a “fix-around,” the brokers to the
original charter party are not entitled to commissions.96 Nor
would these brokers be vested with third party rights.97 This view
is at odds with the English law, where ship brokers are deemed to
be owners and charterers under the Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act of 1999, and under the theory of assignment.98 The
Rights of Third Parties Act and its attendant theory of
assignment, though beneficial to shipbrokers who stand to lose
commissions, can also force these brokers into admiralty
jurisdiction and thus, arbitration.99 To understand this result, the
next sections of this Article will explore the position of shipbrokers
in the space of admiralty jurisdiction in United States and English
law.

on the theory ‘that performance under a modified agreement is not such a
failure of performance as to cause the broker to forfeit his commissions.’” Id.
(quoting Kane, 1948 A.M.C. at 1413).
96. See, e.g., Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp., 1987 A.M.C. at 485.
97. See Parsons v. Wales Shipping Co., 1987 A.M.C. 1576, 1580 (1986)
(finding that there was no evidence to suggest that the contracting parties
intended to confer a benefit on the brokers as third-party beneficiaries).
98. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 33, at 50 (stating the Commissions
Clause in the Charter Party “does not make the broker a party to the
contract,” but under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the
broker can now enforce the promise of the payment of commission); see also
Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co., [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [29]
(Eng.) (holding that a broker was entitled to sue for commission under the
charter party because the effect of the charter party clause was to confer a
benefit on the broker).
99. Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. Ltd., [2003] EWHC 2602
(Comm) [42] (Eng.).
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III. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES: SHIPBROKERS
AND THE PRELIMINARY CONTRACTS DOCTRINE100

Maritime law is unsettled in the United States regarding
shipbrokers and the contracts they enter into. In International
Chartering, the shipbrokers’ claims raised the issue of whether
United States law recognizes shipbrokers under the “owners and
charterers” provision in the charter party form.101 Generally, the
New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Forms Time Charter
provides for arbitration of disputes between “owners and
charterers.”102 “[T]he Court of Appeals held that if the charter
parties’ arbitration clauses were interpreted under English law,
[the Shipbrokers] would be included in the phrase ‘Owners and
the Charterers’ as assignees from the original parties” to the
charter party.103
This conclusion is troubling because in the United States, the
law is still in flux as to whether shipbroker contracts are
enshrined within the admiralty. Both the District Court and the
Second Circuit agreed that under United States law, shipbrokers
are not considered under the “owners and charterers” designation,
and claims arising from the shipbrokers contract will not be
cognizable under the charter party.104 Historically, shipbrokers’
100. See Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 612 (1991)
(overturning the Minturn Rule by holding that “rather than . . . excluding all
or certain agency contracts from the realm of admiralty, lower courts should
look to the subject matter of the agency contract and determine whether the
services performed under the contract are maritime in nature”).
101. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 634–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
102. BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE TIME CHARTER
PARTY EXPLANATORY NOTES (last revised Oct. 15, 2015) (hereinafter NYPE
2015),
available
at
http://www.smf.com.sg/pdf/NYPE%202015%20
Explanatory%20Notes.pdf (“The New York Produce Exchange Form (NYPE)
is the most widely used standard time charter party in the dry cargo sector of
the industry. The first NYPE form was published in November 1913 and
amended in 1921, 1931, 1946, 1981 and 1993 and for a sixth time with the
2015 revision. The 1946 edition is arguably still the most commonly used
version of the NYPE charter, although many of its twenty-eight clauses are
commonly amended or replaced with numerous rider clauses.”).
103. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 634 (citing Int’l
Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F. App’x 81, 83 & n.3
(2d Cir. 2014)).
104. See id. (“[T]his Court held and the Second Circuit did not reverse,
under federal law Plaintiffs are not included in the phrase ‘Owners and the
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contracts were deemed as preliminary services contract, and not
within the cognition of the admiralty law.105 Up until 1991, the
rule set forth in Minturn v. Maynard stood for the proposition
that, agency contracts, which also enveloped shipbroker services
contracts, were per se excluded from admiralty.106 The Minturn
per se exclusionary rule remained the standard until the Supreme
Court announced a new rule in Exxon Corporation v. Central Gulf
Lines.107
In Exxon, the Supreme Court announced a new rule that
agency contracts were not per se excluded from admiralty
jurisdiction.108 Notwithstanding, the Court explained that its
holding was a narrow one, that did not reach the general status of
the preliminary contracts doctrine.109 Thus, the status of
shipbroker contracts still languish in that empty space between
federal and state jurisdiction. In a line of cases after Minturn, the
Court ruled that actions of assumpsit were no longer
automatically excluded from admiralty as long as the claim arose
as a breach of a maritime contract.110
The issue of what types of contracts come within the
admiralty was decided in Insurance Co. v. Dunham,111 and should
have settled once and for all the rule that any contract that called
for the performance of maritime services or maritime transactions
were squarely within admiralty jurisdiction. However, courts
today still go to great lengths to determine whether shipbrokers’
contracts or agreements to pay commission are cognizable in
admiralty law.112 The reason that courts still belabor this point is
Charterers,’ and thus their claims under the charter parties would not be
arbitrable.”).
105. See Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477, 477 (1854), overruled by
Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 612 (1991).
106. Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 605.
107. Id. at 612 (holding that “Minturn is incompatible with current
principles of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts and therefore should be
overruled”).
108. Id. at 607.
109. Id. at 612 (stating that the rule in Exxon is a narrow one removing
“only the precedent of Minturn from the body of rules that have developed
over what types of contracts are maritime”).
110. See, e.g., Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 536 (1946).
111. See New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 1, 22 (1871).
112. See, e.g., id. at 26–29.

2018]

MARITIME ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

73

that others take the position that such agreements are within the
confines of preliminary services contracts. And since the Supreme
Court has yet to state a definitive rule for the preliminary
contracts doctrine’s relationship with maritime law, the
uncertainty persists.113
It would seem that the determination could be an easier one if
the rule in Dunham was given any weight. Dunham declared a
truism that if the nature and subject matter of the contract makes
reference to maritime service or maritime transactions, then that
contract is a maritime contract.114 Moreover, in Kossick, the court
focused on the substance rather than the form of the contract.115
The substance, then, should be what animates the transaction. In
the realm of shipbrokering, the efforts of the shipbroker give birth
to the maritime transaction. The broker not only “fixes” the
vessel, but is also involved throughout the post-fixture process to
the completion of the charter party.116
In International Chartering, the court held that the plaintiffs
were bound to the arbitration agreement under the doctrine of
direct benefit estoppel.117 The court explained that “[w]ithout the
charter parties, no right to commission would exist.”118 Thus, the
existence of the commissions payable under the brokerage
agreements was dependent upon the charter parties.119 Viewed
within the lens of interdependency, brokerage contracts, though
preliminary in nature, should be subject to admiralty jurisdiction,
since these contracts become part of the charter party. The
113. See Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 607 n.3 (explaining that the reason for
the confusion is because “[t]he preliminary contract rule, which excludes
‘preliminary services’ from admiralty, was enunciated in the Second Circuit
as early as 1881. . . . In the Second Circuit, the agency exception to admiralty
jurisdiction—the Minturn rule—has been fused with the preliminary contract
rule.” (internal citations omitted)).
114. See Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 27; see also Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736 (1933).
115. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
116. See GORTON ET AL., supra note 84, at 39–42.
117. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Plaintiffs are estopped from denying the
choice-of-law provisions insofar as their claims arise under the contract. This
is because ‘[a] party is estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate when
it receives a “direct benefit” from a contract containing an arbitration clause,’
even if it is not a signatory to the agreement.” (citation omitted)).
118. Id. at 637.
119. Id.
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charter party and the brokerage agreements, then, enjoy a
symbiotic relationship.120
Notwithstanding, the Second Circuit is still reluctant to
include brokerage contracts in admiralty jurisdiction.121 This
ambivalence on the part of the Second Circuit creates uncertainty
in admiralty law. In a line of cases pre-Exxon, the court analyzed
preliminary contracts, and held as a general matter that these
contracts, such as freight forwarder services, were not cognizable
in admiralty.122 In other words, these contracts were not firmly
entrenched in admiralty because they were too remote from the
tide of maritime commerce.
At the same time, the district courts have observed that these
contracts are not per se excluded.123 Instead, courts should
perform a qualitative analysis, and inquire into the nature of the
tasks to determine the character of the work to be performed.124
In CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., the
court held that admiralty jurisdiction over contracts that “relate[s]
to a ship in its use as such . . . or to transportation by sea or to
maritime employment is fairly said to constitute a maritime
contract.”125 The court’s holding in CTI-Container Leasing
signaled a willingness to avoid a per se rule on preliminary

120. See id. (comparing this case with Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene
Genovese & Gluck, P.C. v. John M. O’Quinn & Assocs., L.L.P., 523 F. App’x.
761 (2d Cir. 2013) (attorney’s fees) and Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
Ass’n v. Henderson, Nos. 10 Civ. 8033(PGG), 11 Civ. 3869(PGG), 2013 WL
1245451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (insurance contract), and concluding that
“a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable for commissions payable
under the brokerage agreements and damages in the amount of such
commissions . . . is a benefit that depends on the charter parties for its
existence. Without the charter parties, no right to commission would exist.
Indeed, the charter parties themselves incorporate the commission rates that
Plaintiffs negotiated.”).
121. See Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir.
1998).
122. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 301 (2d
Cir. 1987); Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson Corp., 739 F.2d 798
(2d Cir. 1984).
123. See Ingersoll, 829 F.2d at 302.
124. See id. (holding that “[i]t is the character of the work to be performed
under the contract that is determinative of whether the agreement was
maritime”).
125. Id. (quoting CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations
Corp., 682 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted)).
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contract services.126 Since then, however, the Second Circuit
appears to be receding from this friendlier shore.
In Shipping Financial Services Corp. v. Drakos, the first case
before the Second Circuit after the Exxon decision, the court made
a drastic move. It disentangled itself from the convergence of
agency contracts and preliminary contracts to avoid collision with
the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Exxon.127 Yet the
Second Circuit, although acknowledging its jurisprudential error
of conflating the agency and the preliminary services contract
doctrines, refused to carve out a rule for the doctrine.128
While the contract at issue in the Drakos case was too
removed from the action that was sued upon, the case presented
an opportunity to further clarify the preliminary contracts
doctrine.129 In the Drakos opinion, the court seemed to go the
extra mile to hold fast to its historical jurisprudence that charter
brokerage contracts are not cognizable in admiralty.130 In Drakos,
the plaintiff broker sued based on a “fix-around.”131 His services
never led to the formation of the actual charter party under which
he was claiming commissions.132 Thus, the court correctly held
that the plaintiff’s role in the charter party was preliminary.133
Hence, his services were not maritime in nature because these
services never resulted in a charter party.134
126. See CTI-Container Leasing Corp., 682 F.2d at 380.
127. See Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that “[a]lthough Exxon instructs that the per se agency contract
exception no longer applies, it does not necessarily require a similar fate for
the preliminary contract doctrine”).
128. See id.
129. See id. (stating that “Exxon now forces us to disentangle [agency
contracts and preliminary contracts] and consider the possibility that while
agency contracts are not a per se exception to admiralty jurisdiction,
preliminary contracts may still be an exception to such jurisdiction”).
130. See id. at 134 (“If The Harvey and Henry and Boyd were to remain
good law after Exxon, they would apply to bar this claim from maritime
jurisdiction.” (citing The Harvey and Henry, 86 F. 656, 657 (2d Cir. 1898);
Boyd, Weir & Sewell, Inc. v. Fritzen-Halcyon Lijn, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 77, 79
(S.D.N.Y. 1989))); id. at 132 (“The doctrine in this Circuit—set forth more
than a century ago and upheld since—provides in pertinent part that
disputes arising out of preliminary services contracts do not invoke maritime
jurisdiction.” (citing The Thames, 10 F. 848, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1881))).
131. See id. at 134.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. (holding that “plaintiff’s purported role in giving advice about
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However, the court’s conclusion in Drakos provided a
harbinger for the inclusion of preliminary services contracts in
admiralty law. The court, while not announcing a bright line rule
for the preliminary services contracts doctrine, hinted that there
was “potential for charter party brokerage agreements to qualify
for admiralty jurisdiction.”135 The questions set out in
the
briefing requests in International Chartering could be an overture
by the court to settle the issue.136
United States maritime law has not characterized brokerage
relationships as firmly rooted in maritime law.137 Thus, absent a
clear assignment of rights that may provide for a maritime lien,
maritime law is not automatically applied to shipbrokers’
commissions. In this same vein, shipbrokers’ commissions are not
automatically excluded from maritime law either.138 It
is
precisely this uncertainty that compels a bright line rule in the
United States for this category of contracts. Until then, these
contracts will continue to be tossed about in the courts by different
winds of doctrine.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER SHIPBROKER CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
MARITIME LAW: THE CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT 1999

While the tenor of maritime law regarding shipbrokers is
uncertain under United States law, the inclusion of these parties
is more firmly entrenched in English law. Under English law,
shipbrokers fall within the term “owners or charterers” under
statute, as well as at law, under a theory of assignment.139
seeking a subcharter in the Gulf lighterage trade” did not “elevate its status
to anything other than a broker” and that plaintiff did not make an
“affirmative showing that its contract [was] ‘maritime in nature’”).
135. Id. (“We reiterate the fact-specific nature of our decision. Having
failed to establish maritime jurisdiction under either the Exxon nature and
subject matter test or the preliminary contract doctrine, plaintiff may not
enjoy the benefit of bringing this case in federal court. In reaching this
conclusion, we make no ruling as to the continuing validity of the preliminary
contract doctrine, or the potential for other charter party brokerage
agreements to qualify for admiralty jurisdiction.”).
136. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
137. See CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., 682
F.2d 377, 380 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982).
138. See Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477, 477 (1854).
139. See Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC 2602
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Furthermore, the authority to join parties is a function of the
court.140 Arbitrators do not have the power to join non-signatories
to a contract.141
Nevertheless, English courts have allowed arbitration of
claims where the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999
applies, or under a theory of assignment. The underlying
rationale is that common issues of law and fact necessitate
joinder.142 In Nisshin Shipping Co., the court rationalizes this
principle under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) doctrine
under the ambit of assignment.143 Presumably, the Second
Circuit in International Chartering Services, Inc. hung its hat on
the principles articulated in Nisshin Shipping Co.144 But the
rationale begs the question of whether forcing these parties to
arbitrate violates the ECHR and American public policy.
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 came into
effect on May 11, 2000.145 The Act has impacted the common law
doctrine of privity of contract as it gives third parties the right to
enforce contracts which “purport to confer a benefit” on them.146
Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, a
shipbroker is a statutory assignee.147 As such, if an arbitration
clause is intended to confer a benefit on a third party, then that
party can enforce the benefit, and as such is bound by the
(Comm) [40, 42], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38. (concluding that under the Rights
of Third Parties Act, a shipbroker is a statutory assignee).
140. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 219 (“[The]
inherent and statutory jurisdiction of the High Court . . . enables it to: (a) join
additional parties . . . and (d) consolidate separate proceedings” in relation to
court proceedings.).
141. Id. (“The essentially consensual basis of arbitrators’ powers means
that they have no inherent powers to make orders binding third parties (i.e.
parties who are not privy to the arbitration agreement pursuant to which the
arbitrator is appointed).”).
142. Id. at 219–20.
143. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [40, 42], [2004] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 38.
144. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F.
App’x 81, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2014).
145. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31.
146. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 33, at 34.
147. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [42], [2004] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 38 (Under section 1(4) of the 1999 Act, the third party “has in
effect become a statutory assignee of the promisee’s right of action against the
promisor . . . .”).
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arbitration clause, although a non-signatory.148
This rule has its genesis in the European Principles of Human
Rights, under which the U.K. was forced to depart from the timehonored rule of privity of contract in order to preserve the rights of
third party beneficiaries.149 But where the Act sought to protect
these rights, it also created a tension where that same third party
was compelled to bring its claim in arbitration, which in turn
raised the issue of whether compelling the third party to arbitrate
also infringed upon his right under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.150
The House of Lords answered this question in the negative under
the rationale that the assignment was a matter of law versus the
intention of the parties.151
Section 1(1) of the Act allows a third party to enforce a
contract term in two situations: (1) where the contract expressly
provides that the party may enforce terms in its own right, and (2)
where the term purports to confer a benefit on the third party.152
This provision is dependent on the construction of the contract to
determine whether the parties intended the term to be enforceable
by the third party. In Nisshin Shipping Co., the court held that a
broker was entitled to sue for commission due under the charter
party under section 1(1)(b) of the Act.153
The Nisshin court also held that the broker’s claims were
subject to the arbitration clause, even though the claim only
referred to disputes between owners and charterers.154 While this
decision by the Nisshin court benefits ship brokers in terms of a
clear jurisdictional rule—brokers are “owners and charterers”
148. See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31.
149. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 232 (“However,
section I of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 . . . enacts an
exception to the doctrine of privity by enabling a third party to enforce, in his
own right, terms in a contract either where there is an express provision
allowing such enforcement or where, subject to a contrary intention, the term
purports to confer a benefit on him.”).
150. See Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [35, 52–53],
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38 (discussing ECHR, Art. 6(1)).
151. See id. at ¶¶ 35–37; see also El Nasharty v. J. Sainsbury Plc [2007]
EWHC 2618 (Comm) [25, 33–34], [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360; Dep’t of Econs.
Policy & Dev. of the City of Moscow v. Bankers Tr. Co. [2004] EWCA Civ 314
[11, 27, 32], [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 179.
152. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31.
153. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [3, 10, 13–15, 21,
23–24, 33], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38.
154. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 40, 42–44.
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under the charter party—it has the effect of forcing them into
arbitration.155 This rationale, then, allows the joinder of nonsignatories who are seeking to avoid arbitration and have their
day in court, which appears at odds with the ECHR and English
law.156
This effect has been challenged and criticized under The
Human Rights Act of 1998, which came into force in England on
October 1, 2000.157 The law slowly crept into the space of
maritime arbitration, even if the primary purpose of the law was
geared towards public law.158 Under the “conditional benefits”
approach, English courts have held that a third party cannot seek
to enforce a term in a contract without also accepting the
obligation to arbitrate.159
Under the ECHR, the principles underlying fundamental
human rights have evolved into the commercial space of private
law by ensuring procedural rights, such as evidentiary matters
and the right to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable
155. Id.
156. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 12. There have
been attempts to argue that arbitration clauses as a whole should be found
contrary to Article 6 of the Convention because they restrict access to a court
hearing. Such attempts have been unsuccessful because Convention
Jurisprudence accepts that, by agreeing to arbitrate, parties waive their
rights to a court hearing under Article 6(1).
157. Id.
158. See id. (“The purpose of the Human Rights Act is to give effect,
within English Law to the rights and freedoms protected by the European
Convention on Human Rights. This Convention is an international treaty
drawn up in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war and the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg was set up to protect the
rights recognised.”).
159. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31. The arbitration
provision of the Act provides:
Where—

(a) a right under section 1 to enforce a term (“the substantive
term”) is subject to a term providing for the submission of
disputes to arbitration (“the arbitration agreement”); and
(b) the arbitration is an agreement in writing for the purposes
of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996,

Id.

the third party shall be treated for the purposes of that Act as a
party to the arbitration agreement as regards disputes between
himself and the promisor relating to the enforcement of the
substantive term by the third party.
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time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”160 These procedural safeguards are mandated by Article
(6)(1) of the Convention.161 These principles, however, while
protecting the rights of parties to a fair hearing, also have the
undesirable effect of forcing non-signatories into arbitration and
denying them access to the courts. This restricted access to a
court hearing has been criticized as contrary to Article 6 (1) of the
ECHR.162 However, courts continue to hold that under ECHR
jurisprudence, an agreement to arbitrate waives the right to a
court hearing.163 This reasoning ignores the effect on parties who,
in fact, are not signatories to the underlying contract and thus,
have not agreed to arbitrate. In confronting this issue in
International Chartering Services, Inc., the Second Circuit and the
District Court, on remand, were forced to engage in a choice of law
analysis under federal law.164
V. CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS: FEDERAL MARITIME CHOICE OF LAW
RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

A.

Choice of Law Analysis: Federal Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a choice of law
clause is presumptively valid where the underlying transaction is
fundamentally international in character.165 In the maritime
context, these clauses will be held invalid only when the foreign
forum will apply its own substantive law, which would result in a
lower recovery below a statutory amount.166 The line of cases
decided on the principles in M/S Bremen and Sky Reefer did not
160. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(1).
161. Id.
162. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 12.
163. See Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC 2602
(Comm) [52–53], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38; Dep’t of Econs. Policy & Dev. of the
City of Moscow v. Bankers Tr. Co. [2004] EWCA Civ 314 [27]; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 179.
164. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 634–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle
Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F. App’x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2014).
165. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); see
also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540
(1995).
166. See Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 550–51 (Stevens J., dissenting) (arguing
that COGSA’s prohibition against lessening statutory liability applies to
foreign forum selection and arbitration clauses).
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tackle the issue of non-signatories.167
The Second Circuit has consistently held that a dispute is
arbitrable if the court finds that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate.168 However, the presumption of validity will be
overcome if applying the choice-of-law clause would be
unreasonable under the circumstances.169 In fact, in a line of
cases, the Second Circuit held that non-signatories should not be
bound by an arbitration clause because this practice offends U.S.
public policy.170 Moreover, the Second Circuit unequivocally
stated that an arbitration clause requires “clear and unmistakable
intent” to enter into arbitration.171
Generally, choice of law and forum selection clauses are
unreasonable and will not be enforced: (1) if “incorporate[ing] [the
clause] into the agreement was the result of fraud or
overreaching”; (2) “if the complaining party will . . . be deprived of
his day in court, due to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of
the selected forum”; (3) “if the fundamental unfairness of the
chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy”; or (4) “if the
clauses contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.”172
In evaluating whether any of these four conditions have been
met, the Court will consider the following factors: (1) any choice of
law provision contained in the contract; (2) the place where the
contract was negotiated, issued, and signed; (3) the place of
performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the contract;
and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation,
and place of business of the parties.173
167. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d
1336 (9th Cir. 1997); Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th
Cir. 1997); Talatala v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Corp., 974 F. Supp. 1321 (D.
Haw. 1997); Pasztory v. Croatia Line, 918 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Va. 1996).
168. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration
Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Chelsea Square Textiles,
Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., 189 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1999)).
169. Id. at 99.
170. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 661–62 (2d Cir.
2005) (rejecting contract’s choice of Egyptian law in favor of arbitrability
because its broad-brush willingness to bind a non-signatory to arbitration
was “contrary to American public policy”).
171. Id.
172. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
173. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d
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Courts have applied federal maritime law to obligations
arising under a charter party to determine issues arising under an
agency relationship.174 In so doing, the court will employ the
maritime choice of law rules established in Lauritzen v. Larsen.175
In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman brought suit in the Southern
District of New York under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Section 688,
alleging that he was negligently injured aboard a ship of Danish
flag and registry while in Havana harbor.176 The ship was owned
by a Danish citizen, and the injured seaman had signed the ship’s
articles providing that disputes would be governed by Danish
law.177 Nevertheless, he sought to invoke United States law.178
The Court held that even where United States law has the
strongest connection to the relevant transaction, international
maritime law will control.179 In focusing on the relevant
transaction test, courts seek to protect the rights of third parties
who may incur detriment because of the itinerant nature of
maritime transactions.180 Therefore, courts will not enforce a
choice of law or forum clause if enforcement “contravenes a strong

488, 499 at n.11 (2d Cir. 2013).
174. See id. at 497 (citing Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.
1980)) (“We applied federal maritime law, ‘which is the law we apply in an
admiralty case,’ to determine whether an undisclosed principal was bound by
contracts made by an agent acting within his authority.”).
175. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953). In Lauritzen, the
balance of factors clearly pointed to application of Danish law: the injured
seaman had minimal contacts with the United States beyond the intangible—
his desire to invoke this nation’s more favorable maritime tort law. 345 U.S.
at 587.
176. Id. at 573.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 581. The Supreme Court laid out a multi-factor choice of
law test, “[t]he purpose of [which,] is to assure that a case will be treated in
the same way under the appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous
circumstances which often determine the forum.” Id. at 591.
180. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d
488, 499 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As is often the case in admiralty, we deal here with
multi-national foreign parties locked in dispute as the result of an alleged
breach of an international shipping contract. Indeed, part of the reason we
authorize maritime attachment is the ‘peripatetic’ nature of maritime parties,
the ‘transitory’ status of their assets . . . and the need for parties to obtain
security ‘[i]n a world of shifting assets, numerous thinly-capitalized
subsidiaries, flags of convenience and flows of currencies’ . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)).
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public policy of the forum.”181
Generally, courts will not view the choice of a sophisticated
forum with a highly developed body of commercial and maritime
law as a contravention to public policy. If the goal is to ensure the
protection of a party’s rights, then a London arbitration is not
likely to contravene public policy because the forum will be
deemed reasonable.182 Where the choice of law clause is
challenged as not binding on the parties, however, the court will
employ a contacts analysis.183 The brokers in this case argued
that all contacts were with the United States.184 Nevertheless,
the court dismissed the United States contact factors because they
were ancillary to the contract at issue.185 In addition, the court
noted that the plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, and that
the contacts analysis only applied to parties to the contract.186 If
the court agrees that these brokers are not parties to the contract,
then joining them to arbitration appears to be a collateral issue.187
B. Choice of Law: Collateral Issues
In choice of law cases where a court is engaged in an alter-ego
analysis, piercing the corporate veil is an issue collateral to the
contract, and courts are not bound by the choice of law clause in
181. See See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138
F. Supp. 3d 629, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d
1353 (2d Cir. 1993)).
182. See id. at 639 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
§ 187 CMT. F (AM. LAW INST. 1971)) (“[T]he Restatement specifically
contemplates that parties to a multistate maritime agreement ‘should be
permitted to submit their contract to some well-known and highly elaborated
commercial law’ with no other connection to the transaction.”).
183. See id. at 639.
184. See id. at 641.
185. See id. (“The contracts subject to contacts analysis are the charter
parties in their entirety, not merely the minor provisions relating to
Plaintiff’s commissions—and certainly not the May 4, 2007 emails, which
Plaintiffs argue form an entirely separate contract.”).
186. See id. at 642 (“[W]hen considering the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties, the
Court looks primarily at the parties to the contract, not the parties to this
lawsuit. However, despite their role in the contract negotiations, plaintiffs are
not parties to the contracts, and thus their locations are less significant than
those of the other participants.”).
187. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d
488, 493 (2d Cir. 2013).
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the underlying contract.188 In International Chartering, the court
couched the joinder of the non-signatories under the doctrine of
direct benefit estoppel to compel the plaintiff to arbitration in
London.189 The doctrine of direct benefit estoppel provides that a
party who claims an entitlement to payment based on the
contractual obligations of a signatory is seeking a benefit under
the contract.190
However, in an earlier case, the Second Circuit stated that if
suits based on brokerage contracts and their collateral claims
regarding third party standing are brought within the admiralty
jurisdiction, federal maritime law will control notwithstanding a
choice of law clause.191 Whether a claim sounds in admiralty is a
procedural question on the matter of the court’s jurisdiction.192
On the other hand, the validity of a claim is a substantive issue
that should be governed by the relevant substantive law: the law
that defines the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the
dispute.193
In Blue Whale, one issue was whether a choice of law
provision governed an alter-ego claim.194 The choice of law clause
provided for arbitration in London, governed by British law.195
The Court in Blue Whale held that the choice of law provision was
preempted by federal law on the alter-ego claim.196 The
determination of which law governs an alter-ego claim was
complex because the court had to first decide whether the issue
concerns the obligations under the contract or whether a party is
an alter-ego. In the end, the court held that the alter-ego issue
was collateral to the contract and, as such, the court was not
bound by the choice of law clause.197
188. Id.
189. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 636–37.
190. Id. (explaining that “[u]nder this doctrine of direct benefit estoppel,
‘a non-signatory who claims entitlement to payment based on the contractual
obligations of a signatory is seeking a benefit under the contract.’” (quoting
Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n v. Henderson, Nos. 10-cv-8033,
11-cv-3869, 2013 WL 1245451, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013))).
191. See Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 496.
192. Id. at 494.
193. Id. at 495.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 491.
196. Id. at 498.
197. See Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 496. The court explained that
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In International Chartering, the issue of joinder was not
premised on an alter-ego claim as in Blue Whale because no
corporate form questions were implicated in International
Chartering.198 However, it can be argued that because these
brokers are not parties to the contract, then the issue of joining
them should also be governed by federal law, and thus, collateral
to the payment of commissions.
As the court explained, the plaintiffs are seeking a benefit
that depended upon the charter parties for its existence, although
plaintiffs contend that the benefits they seek are enshrined in a
separate and independent agreement, which did not become part
of the charter parties.199 Viewed in this light, plaintiffs are not
seeking benefits that are dependent on the charter parties.
Rather, if the agreement at issue is outside of the charter party,
then it is more likely incidental to the charter parties, and not
dependent upon it.
VI. BINDING NON-SIGNATORIES TO ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT
BENEFIT ESTOPPEL IN UNITED STATES LAW

Federal courts have held that so long as there is some written
agreement to arbitrate, a third party may be bound to submit to
arbitration.200 However, ordinary principles of contract and
agency law may be called upon to bind a non-signatory to an
agreement whose terms have not clearly done so.201 In so holding,

Blue Whale’s claim against HNA sounds in admiralty because it
arose from this maritime contract—however, the substance of the
attachment claim concerns whether HNA is an alter ego of
Development. This corporate identity inquiry is indeed distant from
the dispute over the charter party’s provisions regarding the
transport of iron ore. For this reason, we find that “the issue of
piercing the corporate veil is collateral to the contract, and thus this
Court is not bound by the choice of law provision.”
Id. (quoting United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA) Ltd., Inc.,
848 F. Supp. 751, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
198. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
199. Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 493.
200. Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party—Who is a
Proper Party in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration
Association and Other International Institutions, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
711, 720 (2003).
201. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin
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courts have recognized six theories for binding a non-signatory to
an arbitration agreement: (a) incorporation by reference; (b)
assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing/alter ego; (e) estoppel; and
(f) third-party beneficiary.202 However, these factors are not
dispositive.203 At the bedrock of all the preceding factors is an
overwhelming concern for public policy in United States law.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) controls whether an
American non-signatory agreed to be bound by arbitration.204 For
example, in Sarhank, the arbitrators concluded that Oracle, a
non-signatory to a contract, was bound by its subsidiary’s
signature under an Egyptian choice of law clause.205 However,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that despite
the choice of law clause, American Federal arbitration law
controls and that an American non-signatory cannot be bound to
arbitrate “in the absence of a full showing of facts supporting an
articulable theory based on American contract law or American
agency law.”206
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. held that the
Federal Arbitration act applied to Ecuador, despite the fact that
the New York Convention did not apply, as Ecuador and the
United States were signatories to the Inter-American
Convention.207 By so holding, the court appeared to clarify its
holding in Sarhank by making a distinction based on the status of
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 202 (3d Cir. 2001); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v.
Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995).
202. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003);
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 269 F.3d at 195–202; Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64
F.3d at 776.
203. See ACE Capital Re Oversees Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307
F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts employ a two-part test in
determining the arbitrability of claims: “(1) whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate disputes at all; and (2) whether the dispute at issue comes within
the scope of the arbitration agreement”); see also Specht v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 2002); Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 F.3d
at 776 (stating that “[a]rbitration is contractual by nature—‘a party cannot
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit’” (quoting United Steelworkers of Am.v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))).
204. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2005).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d
334, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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the party seeking the remedy, not the remedy itself. In the
process, the court reconciled Motorola and Sarhank, and
articulated that a choice of law clause will govern a non-signatory
where the non-signatory seeks to compel arbitration, not where
the situation is reversed.208 In sum, the court created a bright
line that only non-signatories seeking to compel arbitration will be
bound by a choice of law clause. In International Chartering,
however, the court regressed from this line of demarcation, and
clouded the water by pouring the doctrine of direct benefit
estoppel into the analysis.209
In International Chartering, the court held that compelling
the shipbrokers to arbitrate their claim did not violate U.S. public
policy against forced arbitration.210 It legitimized its holding
under the doctrine of direct benefit estoppel, and the principles
outlined in the earlier Motorola opinion.211 In Motorola, the nonsignatory parties who were being sued by Motorola attempted to
force Motorola to arbitrate its claims against them.212 In applying
the Swiss choice of law clause in the contracts, the Second Circuit
saw no concern with binding these non-signatories to the Swiss
choice of law rules because they had invoked the arbitration
clause; thus, under the principle of estoppel, they were bound to
the choice of law clause.213 In its reasoning, the court dismissed
the legally significant fact in Motorola; a cardinal sin in analogical
reasoning.214
208. See id. at 356.
209. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 636. (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
210. Id. (stating that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs are not signatories to the
charter parties, and they are not seeking to invoke the arbitration provisions
in the contracts as were the defendants in Motorola, applying English law
and requiring Plaintiffs to arbitrate does not go against American public
policy”).
211. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 51 (2d Cir. 2004).
The court explained that there were no concerns about binding the nonsignatory defendants, because if they “wish to invoke the arbitration clauses
in the agreements at issue, they must also accept the Swiss choice-of-law
clauses that govern those agreements.” Id. In other words, Defendants were
bound to the choice of law clauses by estoppel, a theory rooted in traditional
contract principles and acceptable to American public policy.
212. Id. at 50.
213. Id. at 51.
214. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 636 (“[L]ike the
Motorola defendants, Plaintiffs are estopped from denying the choice-of-law
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In Motorola, the animating factor that triggered estoppel was
that the non-signatories in this case invoked the arbitration
clause, while at the same time denying the choice of law.215
Conversely, in International Chartering, the non-signatories did
not invoke the arbitration clause.216 In fact, the non-signatories
did not claim benefits under the charter parties. Rather, their
claims were based on a separate contract. Based on this fact, the
plaintiffs in International Chartering were not like the plaintiffs
in Motorola. They were just the opposite—they were nonsignatories who did not wish to invoke the arbitration clause in
the underlying contract. While there was some nexus to the
charter parties, the question for the court was whether this
separate agreement was subject to the arbitration clause.
A determination of whether a party has agreed to submit a
dispute to arbitration depends on the terms of the contract.
Generally, non-signatories to an arbitration agreement can be
compelled to arbitrate their claims in certain circumstances.217
Where the non-signatory is suing directly under the agreement
containing the arbitration clause or has directly benefited from
such agreement, courts will employ the federal law doctrine of
equitable estoppel to compel the non-signatory to arbitrate its
claim.218
provisions insofar as their claims arise under the contract. This is because
[a] party is estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate when it receives
a ‘direct benefit’ from a contract containing an arbitration clause,” even if it is
not a signatory to the agreement.”).
215. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 52–53.
216. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 635.
217. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 43; American Bureau of
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
World Omni Fin. Corp. v. Ace Capital, 64 Fed. Appx. 809, 812–13 (2d Cir.
2003); Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n v. Henderson, 2013 WL
1245451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013); Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese
& Gluck v. John M. O’Quinn & Assoc., 523 Fed. Appx. 761 (2d Cir. 2013).
218. Am. Personality Photos v. Mason, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (holding that the owner of property found in a building during
environmental remediation, which was a non-signatory to the remediation
services agreement, could not be compelled to arbitrate its replevin and
conversion causes of action against the owner of the remediation services
provider based on a theory of equitable estoppel, where the provider’s owner
failed to show that the property owner directly benefited from the agreement,
the provider’s owner signed the remediation agreement as president of the
provider and not in his individual capacity, while the claims were against the
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Under the estoppel theory, a company knowingly exploiting
an agreement with an arbitration clause can be estopped from
avoiding arbitration despite having never signed the
agreement.219 Where a company knowingly accepts the benefits of
an agreement with an arbitration clause, even without signing the
agreement, that company may be bound by the arbitration clause.
The court in World Omni Financial Corp. explained that, under
such theory, the benefits must be direct, which was to say, they
must flow directly from the agreement, as opposed to indirectly,
where the non-signatory merely exploits the contractual relation
of parties to an agreement but does not exploit (and thereby
assume) the agreement itself.220
Where the third party is deemed a co-plaintiff of a nonadverse signatory, courts have generally not required the third
party to arbitrate unless there is a showing that the claims are
intertwined, and the non-signatory is seeking a benefit from the
original agreement.221 This principle of “intertwinement” holds
more potency to compel arbitration on the theory of efficiency and
confusion. It stands to reason that if claims are so intertwined,
then to promote judicial efficiency the claims should be heard
together. This principle furthers the desired goals of efficiency
and the avoidance of inconsistent judgments on the same issues or
claims.
president in his individual capacity, and the dispute was separate from the
dispute between the agreement’s signatories that was already being
arbitrated).
219. See World Omni Fin. Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. at 812–13 (2d Cir. 2003)
(insurance claimant received direct benefit from reinsurance policy to which
it was not a signatory).
220. See id. at 813.
221. See, e.g., Chew v. KPMG, 407 F. Supp. 2d 790, 805 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
The court in Chew found that the “intertwined claims” theory of equitable
estoppel could not be applied by a non-signatory against a non-signatory any
more than it could be applied by a signatory. Id. at 805. Thus, the court held
that the claims against the accounting firm and law firm asserted in court by
customers of the securities firm who had not signed any customer agreement
containing an arbitration clause were not subject to the accounting firm’s or
law firm’s motion to compel arbitration under the principles of equitable
estoppel. Id. The court explained that even a signatory to an arbitration
agreement cannot compel to arbitration a non-signatory to the agreement, at
least under the estoppel theory that the claims of the signatory and nonsignatory are intertwined with one another, and that what the movants were
asking the court to do was one step further removed from that principle. Id.
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In the International Chartering decision, the court viewed the
shipbrokers’ relationship, not the separate contract,
as
intertwined with the charter parties through the prism of
dependency.222 The direct benefit estoppel doctrine articulated by
the court is essentially an operation of the principle of deemed
consent, frequently employed by arbitrators in the joinder of a
non-signatory.223 Under United States law, the principle of
deemed consent navigates through the doctrine of estoppel, while
in some Continental legal systems, such as the French legal
system, consent will be implied where a “chain” of transactions is
established.224
The principle of deemed consent was the hallmark of Dow
Chemical, which also gave birth to the Group of Companies
Doctrine.225 Under the Dow Chemical rubric, the assumption is
that the party sought to be joined was involved in the initial and
final stages of the transaction, i.e., the negotiation and the
conclusion of the contract.226 Under this view, the elements of
negotiation, conclusion and execution are merged to form the basis
for the joinder. This prescription bodes well when the nonsignatory invokes the favor of the arbitration clause. Arguably,
the doctrine has a place for corporate veil piercing purposes.
However, the doctrine does not hold any appeal to operate as a
broad brush in the space of international commercial arbitration.
This doctrine and other surrogates, such as direct benefit estoppel
and assignment, should never be used as a prescription by arbitral
tribunals for those who are non-signatories and do not desire
joinder in international arbitration.227
222. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 636–37(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
223. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.44–46.
224. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.47. The American doctrine permits
courts to direct arbitration with respect to facts intimately intertwined with a
cause of action subject to arbitration. Id. On the other hand, the French
procedural framework of a claim will follow the transfer of substantive rights
along a chain of buyers and sellers. In each case, the parties’ reasonable
expectations require that arbitration be imposed by virtue of facts which in
fairness must be assimilated to consent. Id.
225. See Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, ICC No. 4131/1982; Win
Line (UK) Ltd. v. Masterpart (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. [2000] 2 SLR 98, 118–19.
226. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.72.
227. Id. at 1.74 (“In Dow Chemical, the non-signatory did not resist
arbitration, but wished to join a proceeding already initiated by its affiliates.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING: AMELIORATING THE
COERCIVE NATURE OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS

Under traditional notions of privity of contract, a third party
cannot be obligated to perform under a contract without the free
and unfettered consent of that person.228 A corollary of the
doctrine is that a third party did not have the right to sue to
enforce a contract absent consideration flowing from the third
party to the promisor, or from some other person at the promisor’s
request.229 But the doctrine of privity of contract has always been
at odds with mercantile practice, and does not comport with
commercial realties.230 Thus, its death would not be mourned in
the law of commercial transactions. However, with the death of
the privity doctrine, the doctrines of implied or “deemed” consent
gain strength, which means that the right of third parties to
choose the forum and law that will govern their disputes is
weakened or eradicated.231 This proverbial double-edged sword
raises its ugly head in the joinder of non-signatories who are
ensnared in the world of standard form contracts. The practice
conflates freedom of contract and freedom from contract, which
beg the question of whether it is fair and just to the nonsignatory.232
Given the current posture of English and American courts to
compel third parties to arbitration, contract drafters must now be
cognizant of contemporary approaches to contract law and make
The non-signatory was able to show that ‘the application of the arbitration
clause . . . conforms to the mutual intent of the parties.’ The party resisting
arbitration had in fact agreed to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute.
Id. The only issue was whether it would be compelled to honor that
arbitration commitment with respect to affiliates of the otherwise legitimate
claimant companies.”).
228. See NEIL ANDREWS, CONTRACT LAW: THIRD PARTIES AND ASSIGNMENT,
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND ‘BURDENS,’ 221 (Colum. Univ. Press, 2011).
229. See id. (explaining the General Principle of Privity of Contract that
contracts “cannot be thrust on parties behind their backs,” and that
“[f]reedom of contract, a cornerstone of private law prevents [a third
party] . . . from being burdened without his consent”).
230. See Neil Andrews, Strangers to Justice No Longer: Reversal of the
Privity Rule Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 60
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 353 (2001).
231. See id. at 368.
232. See BRIAN H. BIX, MODERN CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND
CONTEXT, 128 (Cambridge U. Press, 2012).
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sure to draft appropriately to avoid malpractice. Adopting
elements from the law of trusts when drafting contract arbitration
clauses is instructive. In the law of trusts, express language is
required in order to confer a right on a third party.233 Thus, it
should be expressly stated in the arbitration clause whether third
parties are bound to resolve their disputes through arbitration.
This means that standard forms must now include a non-exclusive
jurisdiction clause alongside an exclusive jurisdiction clause. In
addition, given the reach of the Act, forms should include an
exclusion clause, which gives third parties the right to exclude the
1999 Act if the contract calls for dispute resolution in London.234
Such clauses will benefit third parties. The implication here, of
course, is increased transaction costs in the revision of the various
standard forms used in shipping and also insurance contracts
involved in the carriage of goods.235 But, when compared to the
costs to have a court determine whether third parties are bound to
arbitration, the benefits of revising standard forms outweigh the
costs of litigation and provides certainty to all parties.
VIII. DEFECTIVE CONSENT: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERCEPTION OF
ARBITRATION AS LITIGATION’S GENTLER COUSIN

The disposition of the International Chartering case is a
harbinger of a trend in United States courts to favor the joinder of
non-signatories to arbitration.236 This practice signals a reversal
from the posture of United States jurisprudence to ensure parties
consent to arbitration. By treating the right to payment for
services under the principle of direct benefit estoppel, courts seem
poised to unlock an arbitration clause from its moorings as an
agreement between signatories to descend upon anyone who
provides ancillary services.
Although there are strong Supreme Court precedents under
the FAA237 to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts, recently,
233. See, e.g., Fornazor Int’l, Inc. v. Huntsman, No. 2:14-CV-291 TS, 2015
WL 6142962, at *8 (D. Utah Oct. 19, 2015) (“Under Utah law, ‘only if the
written contract’s clear intent is to confer rights upon a third party may that
third party enforce rights and obligations of the contract.’”).
234. See ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 215.
235. See NYPE 2015, supra note 102.
236. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 3d 629, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
237. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–16 (2012).
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mandatory arbitration is being challenged in the United States,
particularly in consumer transactions. In recent
times,
mandatory arbitration provisions have been attacked as an
exploitative tool, as it relates to members of the military.238
Challenges to mandatory arbitration provisions have been posed
in other states, like California.239 Although these actions are
grounded in protection of consumers from exploitative practices,
third parties who provide ancillary services to large businesses are
in need of protection as well. At the very least, these third parties
should be informed of their rights by way of a properly drafted
standard forms.240
The swing towards joinder based on expediency deprives third
parties of their day in court, and implicates human rights
concerns. Unless parties make clear the intention to arbitrate a
dispute, courts must not allow tentacles of an arbitration clause to
reach out and grip third parties in its grasp. In so doing, the
practice offends the public policy concerns that underlie the rights
enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, The Right to a Fair Trial,241
the British Human Rights Act 1998,242 and American public policy
underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).243
Interestingly, the UK courts have interpreted the Contract
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1990 in the area of bailment law as
conferring only benefits and not burdens on third parties.244 In
terms of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, the Privy Council has held
that an owner who is a non-party to the bailment contract
between a bailee and a sub-bailee is bound to the clause only if the
owner expressly or impliedly consented to the conditions in that
238. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 987 (e)(3), (f)(4) (making mandatory arbitration
provisions in consumer credit agreements with a member of the U.S. military
unlawful and unenforceable).
239. BIX, supra note 232, at 130 n.19.
240. Id. at 140 (positing that refusal to enforce one-sided terms may
“create incentives for better or fairer drafting of standard forms”).
241. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S.
No. 5.
242. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
243. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
244. See ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 223 (“Bailment is a possessor’s (a
bailee’s) responsibility for goods owned by the bailor (either an owner or
someone with a right to possession). The bailee assumes responsibility to
exercise reasonable care of the owner’s goods. This relation normally
involves a contract between the bailor and the bailee.”).
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contract.245
Under both English and American commercial law
jurisprudence, devices are available to contracting parties to
structure their contract to provide notices to third parties
regarding choice of forum and choice of law clauses.246 Where
sophisticated parties fail to take advantage of drafting devices, the
innocent party should not be punished for poor drafting.
Himalaya clauses can facilitate the inclusion of a third party as if
he or she was a party to the contract in chief.247 A Himalaya
clause spells out the liabilities of third parties to a contract, and
serves to provide certainty in commercial law.248 Although most
Himalaya clause jurisprudence relates to maritime contracts
concerning bills of lading, these clauses are applicable to all
contracts involving third parties.249 At the very least, the broker
commission section on the standard forms should be revised to
include a “broker” clause that is tantamount to a Himalaya clause.
The rise of third party litigation relating to third party benefits
and burdens should signal to drafters a need to include
Himalaya clauses that clarify these rights, thus closing the
floodgates of litigation on this issue. Proper drafting to inform
third parties of their rights in resolving disputes preserves respect
and trust for the time-honored practice of consent to arbitration.
When parties are properly informed of the choice of forum,
arbitration will be less thought of as the commercial boogey man
lurking in the shadows, and its rightful place as an antidote to
litigation will be restored.
CONCLUSION

Where parties desire arbitration, the decision to join all
relevant parties to arbitration is considerably easier than
245. See, e.g., Watkins v. M/V. London Senator, 112 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517
(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a “Himalaya Clause . . . extends benefits to any
agents, servants, or independent contractors performing ‘any part of the
Carriage’”); ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 223 (citing The Pioneer Container
(1994), 2 AC 324, PC).
246. See, e.g., Watkins, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
247. See, e.g., Avikama Corp v. M/V Hanjin Marseilles, 162 F.3d 571, 574
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that privity of contract is not required in order to
benefit from a Himalaya clause).
248. See id. at 574.
249. Id. at 573.
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compelling a party who is resisting joinder.250 To compel a nonsignatory to arbitration triggers public policy concerns and the
attendant issues of due process and fundamental justice.251 The
joinder of non-signatories is a public policy concern in the United
States, Britain, and Continental Europe. Given the rights at
stake, courts and arbitral tribunals should tread cautiously when
deciding to join a non-signatory who resists arbitration. Here, the
decision becomes a “sword and shield” scenario, and the
surrogates and substitutes that are employed to permit
arbitration cannot be dispatched so readily to compel
arbitration.252
Under principles of comity and an increasing need for
uniformity in maritime law, and international trade law, the task
of upholding choice of law rules in international maritime
contracts is a pressing one for courts and arbitral tribunals. To
further the goals of certainty and uniformity, our Supreme Court
has favored arbitration to ensure the survival of the international
commercial system.253 Despite these valiant goals, the tension
lies in promoting uniformity while at the same time protecting
fundamental rights of fairness and justice.
At the heart of these rights lies the element of consent.
Where consent is contested, an arbiter must weigh facts with more
scrutiny to preserve these fundamental rights. Where the
resistance is based on the existence of an agreement separate from
the contract containing the arbitration clause, the outcome hinges
250. Park, supra note 3, at 22 (“The scrutiny and the evidence must be
greater when an attempt is made to force (rather than to permit) joinder by a
non-signatory. In joining a non-signatory, the evidence of consent would
normally require special circumstances.”).
251. See id.
252. Id. (“Policy reasons as well as practical considerations make it
difficult to compare a situation where the non-signatory does want to
arbitrate with one where the nonsignatory does not want to arbitrate. In the
latter instance, the drawbacks of parallel proceedings must be weighed
against the serious countervailing considerations of imposing arbitration on
clearly unwilling entities. When the non-signatory has never consented to
arbitration, more analytic rigor and hesitation are in order before extension
should be ordered. The very basis of arbitral jurisdiction is prima facie
absent.”).
253. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 631 (1985) (holding that the presumption in favor of a choice of forum
clause “is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution”).
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on whether the arbitration clause is reasonable.254 But,
“reasonableness” should not be based only on the sophistication of
the commercial and maritime laws of a given forum. Rather,
whether a clause is reasonable should depend on whether parties
had notice and an opportunity to agree on the choice of forum.
Informed consent lies at the heart of reasonableness.
While the international system cries out for uniformity and
certainty in commercial law, these goals should not displace the
primordial right of consent that has been enshrined in arbitration
since time immemorial. Joinder should be the exception where
non-signatories are concerned, not the rule. The Second Circuit
acknowledged this principle in its precedent cases.255 The
practice of joining non-signatories to arbitration have also been
rejected as repugnant to English law and other Continental
countries.256 Legal surrogates like “direct benefit estoppel,”
“conditional benefit” or “economic reality” serve as destabilizing
forces in the system of arbitration.
The practice of forcing non-signatories to arbitrate co-opts the
fundamental right of parties to consent to arbitration. Consent is
a primordial favorite of the law. In the end, the practice does not
254. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362–63 (2d Cir.1985).
255. See, e.g., id. at 1360.
256. See Park, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that, outside of France, few legal
systems welcome the group of companies’ doctrine; for example: the English
decision in the Peterson Farms case was clear in its disapproval, stating that
an arbitral tribunal’s approach in applying the doctrine was “seriously
flawed,” and concluding that “where an arbitration agreement (or the contract
in which it is contained) is subject to English law . . . an ICC arbitral tribunal
has no jurisdiction to apply the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine”); see also id. at
27 (“The tribunal found no evidence of consent to arbitrate merely because the
non-signatory participated in the contract negotiation, noting “[i]f the
Claimant had intended [the non-signatory] to be a party to either the Contract
or its arbitration clause it could have so insisted at that time.”); id. at 26 (“The
tribunal refused to extend the arbitration
clause to non-signatory
respondents, and expressed skepticism with respect to the group of companies
doctrine generally. There was a finding that the non-signatory’s mention of
‘our company’ and ‘our agreement’ were irrelevant, given that the reference
was clearly on behalf of the signatory entity.”); Petersen Farms, Inc. v. C&M
Farming Ltd. [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm) [47] (Eng.). In the context of the
Group of Companies doctrine the agreement was that Arkansas law was the
same as English law. As I have already said, English law treats the issue as
one subject to the chosen proper law of the Agreement and that excludes the
doctrine which forms no part of English law.
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promote the desired goals of uniformity in international
arbitration. Rather, where arbitrators are given carte blanche to
make public policy, the central purpose of neutrality in the
arbitral process is weakened, and the space of international
arbitration is flooded with uncertainty, and mired in allegations of
injustice. The practice of arbitration must get back to its
primordial roots of building bridges between parties, instead of its
current trend of building walls against justice.

